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Laurence R. Heifer*

Consensus, Coherence and
the European Convention on
Human Rights

Introduction
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' is widely regarded as the most effective international instrument for the protection of individual rights. 2 The
Convention's reputation as a bulwark against arbitrary government
interference stems at least in part from the fact that the decisions of its
judicial enforcement organs, the European Court of Human Rights
("Court") and the European Commission of Human Rights ("Commis* Law Clerk, ChiefJudge Dolores K. Sloviter, United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. J.D. 1992, New York University School of Law; M.P.A. 1992,
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University;
B.A. 1987, Yale University.
I would like to thank David Boyd, Richard Falk, Jessica Vapnek, Robert
Wintemute, and Edward Zimmerman for their helpful advice and comments on
earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention].
2. WARWICK A. McKEAN, EQUALIrY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAw 204 (1983) (Convention is the "most generally effective" international treaty for
protecting human rights); JOHN G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGrrs 17 (1988) (Convention is regarded
as the most highly developed scheme of international human rights protection in the
world).

The Convention guarantees the following rights: life (Article 2); freedom from

torture, inhuman treatment (Article 3), or enslavement (Article 4); liberty (Article 5);

fair public hearings by an impartial tribunal (Article 6); freedom from retroactive
criminal convictions (Article 7); respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence (Article 8); freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 9); freedom of expression (Article 10); freedom of association (Article 11); freedom to marry
and found a family (Article 12); and freedom to enjoy these rights without discrimination (Article 14). Convention, supra note 1.
Several optional Protocols to the Convention provide additional human rights
guarantees. See, e.g., Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (guaranteeing
the right to education, free elections, and peaceful enjoyment of property).
26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133 (1993)
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sion"), are almost universally respected and implemented by the twenty-

four European nations ("Contracting States") 3 that have ratified the
4
Convention.

The Contracting States' compliance is especially significant given
the teleological approach that the Court and Commission (the "tribunals") use to interpret the Convention. Far from being bound by the
intention of the drafters, the tribunals interpret the Convention as a
modem document that responds to and progressively incorporates
changing European social and legal developments. Toward this end,
they search for the existence of rights-enhancing practices and policies
among the Contracting States that affect human rights. 5 When these
practices achieve a certain measure of uniformity, a "European consensus" so to speak, the Court and Commission raise the standard of rightsprotection to which all states must adhere. In this way the tribunals have
expanded the Convention's reach to groups of individuals whom the
drafters did not view as falling within the Convention's protective
6
ambit.
3. The Contracting States are those European nations that have ratified the
Convention. They include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications,
No. 5 (July 1992). Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland have signed the Convention but
had not ratified it as of July 1,1992. Id.
4. The Contracting States comply with their Convention obligations by introducing legislative amendments, reopening judicial proceedings, granting administrative pardons, and paying monetary damages to individuals whose rights have been
violated. See Fredrik G.E. Sundberg, The European Experience of Human Rights Proceedings: The PrecedentialValue of the European Court's Decisions, 20 AKRON L. REv. 629, 63542 (1987).
5. See Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979) (Convention
must be interpreted "in light of present-day conditions"); Tyrer v. United Kingdom,
26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1978) (Convention must be interpreted as a "living
instrument").
In nearly all cases decided to date, the Court and Commission have used this evolutionary methodology to incorporate rights-enhancing law reforms into the Convention. There is still much scholarly debate over whether rights-limiting modifications
should be given similar effect. For a discussion of this question, see Paul Mahoney,
JudicialActivism andJudicialSelf-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides
of the Same Coin, II HuM. RTs. LJ. 57, 66-68 (1990); Colin Warbrick, The Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)Act 1976 and the European Convention on Human Rights:
The McVeigh Case, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 757, 758-60 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Ozturk v. Federal Republic of Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
36 (1984) (Bernhardt, J., dissenting) ("In the Dudgeon case [extending the right of
privacy to homosexuals], the Court held that certain sexual behavior, formerly punishable under the criminal law in all States, should no longer be treated as criminal
and punishable in a given social environment."); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 19 (1979) ("[A]t the time when the Convention ... was drafted, it was
regarded as permissible and normal... to draw a distinction in this area between the
'illegitimate' and 'legitimate' family.").
It should be emphasized that the tribunals only apply the consensus inquiry to
human rights that are explicitly or implicitly protected by the Convention. The consensus inquiry is not an appropriate device to incorporate entirely new rights and
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Nearly all those offering commentary on the Court and Commission
have viewed this evolutionary interpretation as beneficial to the development of Convention case law, disagreeing only on how far a particular
practice must evolve before it should be applied against less progressive
states that have failed to modify their laws. 7 Yet little scholarly attention
has been devoted to normative aspects of the European consensus
inquiry. In particular, few commentators have explored the implications
of the tribunals' inability to define the consensus inquiry with precision
when articulating the expanding obligations of European governments
8
to protect individual rights.
This Article focuses in depth on the ambiguity in the tribunals' current consensus methodology and its effect on the development of a
coherent European human rights jurisprudence. 9 It argues that the failure to articulate with precision the scope and function of the consensus
inquiry poses a potentially grave threat to the tribunals' authority as the
arbiters of European human rights. Without a consistent definition of
the conditions under which emerging human rights principles should be
incorporated into the Convention, the tribunals risk judicial illegitimacy
whenever they depart from an interpretation based on the intent of the
Convention's drafters. The time has come, therefore, to develop a more
comprehensive and rigorous methodology for applying the European
consensus inquiry.
freedoms into the Convention. For a more extended discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
7. See MERRILLS, supra note 2, at 157:
Deciding whether European thought and practice has reached the stage at
which conduct which might once have been regarded as unexceptional
should now be condemned is never easy. If the Court is too conservative it
will be accused of failing to uphold the objectives of the Convention. If it is
too radical it will be accused of improper judicial legislation.

Id.; P. VAN

DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTs 603 (2d ed. 1990) ("[IThe Commission and the Court, in their

case-law, should make efforts at searching for ... and elaborating common standards
for the interpretation of the Convention."); Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos Case:
New Light on Reservations to MultilateralTreaties, 29 VA.J. INT'L L. 347, 385 (1989) (The
"slow, evolutionary process toward a uniform European protection of basic human
rights is faithful to the vision which inspired those who created the European Convention system nearly forty years ago."); Thomas A. O'Donnell, The Margin ofAppreciation Doctrine: Standardsin theJurisprudenceof the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HuM.
RTS. Q. 474, 483 (1982) (The Court has been unwilling "to require specific measures
to be followed uniformly by the member states if the basic standards of the Convention can be met in a variety of ways."); Colin Warbrick, "Federal"Aspectsof the European
Convention on Human Rights, 10 MICH.J. INV'L L. 698, 715 (1989) ("The Court has not
required that the States travel forward at the speed of the fastest. Where there
remains diversity among the States' practices, a State may well be justified in maintaining its position.").
8. For one notable exception, see Mahoney, supra note 5, at 62-88 (discussing
whether consensus methodology results in inappropriate judicial activism).
9. For an argument that stresses the importance of finding a coherent jurisprudential vision for the tribunals, see Colin Warbrick, Coherence and the European Courtof
Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background to the Soering Case, 11 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 1073
(1990).
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Part I of this Article discusses the attempt by the Court and Commission to balance deference to national decision-makers against a teleological interpretation of the Convention. It then points out that this
judicial balancing has led to a slow and somewhat haphazard development of the consensus inquiry. Although the tribunals view certain factors such as domestic law reforms, international treaties, and European
public opinion as authoritative evidence of emerging human rights
norms, they have not specified the relative weights to be given these
factors, nor have they explained why certain elements are emphasized in
some cases but not in others.
Part II then examines the jurisprudential concerns that are a consequence of the tribunals' failure to define the consensus inquiry with precision. For example, in the absence of a principled application of the
inquiry, the Contracting States may be less willing to accept judicial
expansion of their Convention obligations. In addition, the tribunals'
practice of treating their prior decisions as authoritative may be weakened, particularly where those decisions articulate a new rule of rightsprotection based on an unclear assessment of the consensus factors.
Part II concludes that these doctrinal difficulties have arisen because the
Court and Commission are uncertain of their role in developing uniform
European human rights standards.
To place these ideas in a concrete factual context, Part III examines
the tribunals' jurisprudence on family law, gender equality, and
transsexualism. It explores the tensions produced by an uncertain
application of the consensus inquiry in these areas, concluding that the
Court and Commission have rendered decisions whose reasoning and
outcomes are difficult to reconcile.
As a first step toward remedying these problems, the Article concludes in Part IV by recommending a general strategy for the tribunals
to apply the European consensus inquiry. The proposal emphasizes the
crucial role of the Convention's text in determining when rights-enhancing law reforms should be incorporated into the Convention. It then
suggests ways in which the Court and Commission can analyze the consensus factors themselves, focusing on domestic and international legal
developments that will assist them in balancing deference to national
decision-makers against the need to develop a common acceptance and
observance of human rights in Europe.
I. The European Convention and the Consensus Inquiry
A.

Consensus and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine' °

In determining the scope of the obligations that the Convention
imposes on the Contracting States, the Court and Commission weigh
deference to national decision-makers against their conviction that the
10. This section, which succinctly describes the rationales underlying the margin

of appreciation doctrine for readers unfamiliar with the Convention's system of
adjudication, is based on a more extended discussion of the same subject in Laurence
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treaty must be interpreted in light of progressive European conditions
and attitudes. Striking the balance between these two competing goals
is difficult, for although the tribunals have indicated that the Convention
must be interpreted as a "living instrument"" and "in light of presentday conditions,"' 2 they have also acknowledged that the Contracting
States are entitled to a substantial degree of deference, or, to use their
13
words, a "margin of appreciation" for their actions.
The justifications for respect and deference are considerable. The
tribunals are keenly aware that the Convention continues to exist solely
by consent of the Contracting States. 14 In an extreme case, a state faced
with an unfavorable judgment can choose not to renew the right of individual petition or can withdraw from the Convention altogether. 15 A
state can also express its displeasure through less drastic means, for
example, by failing to comply with a judgment or by delaying its execution.1 6 By contrast, the only genuine enforcement action that other
Contracting States may take is to banish the offending state from the
Council of Europe, the multi-national organization to which all of the
7
Convention's signatories are members.'
The Court and Commission are also aware that they are not
national legislatures or courts with plenary authority to strike the balance between competing interests in complex areas of law and public
policy.' 8 Thus, they will not require a Contracting State to provide what
they consider to be the most comprehensive human rights protection
possible. Rather, if the laws of a Contracting State are on the "margin"
of compatibility with the Convention, the tribunals will defer to the
state's judgment in striking the balance between individual rights and
R. Helfer, Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategiesfora United Europe, 32 VA.J.
INT'L

L. 157, 162-66 (1991).

11. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1978).
12. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979).
13. See, e.g., James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44 (1986)
("Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and
to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations permit a different treatment
in law."); Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 36 (1985) (same).
14. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 66.

15. See Warbrick, supra note 7, at 709 (discussing the "contingent nature of a
state's participation in the Convention system").
16. For a discussion of the remarkably few instances in which such dilatory tactics
were attempted, see Sundberg, supra note 4, at 641.
17. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103. The
Council is composed of two principal bodies. The Parliamentary Assembly, a legislative body composed of representatives appointed by each member state's national
Parliament, debates and makes recommendations concerning any matter that affects
the Council. Id. arts. 23, 25. The Committee of Ministers, composed of the member
states' ministers of foreign affairs or their designees, is the Council's executive arm.
It enforces the judgments of the Court and has the power to make recommendations
to the member states on areas of common concern. Id. art. 15; Convention, supra
note 1, art. 54.
18. See The Belgian Linguistics Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1968)
(Court cannot ignore subsidiary nature of Convention).
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the public interest. 19
The Court and Commission have not, however, allowed these prudential concerns for deference to frustrate their vision of the Convention as a treaty that responds to changing legal thought and practice
across Europe. Instead, the tribunals have progressively narrowed the
margin of appreciation doctrine by analyzing the degree to which common human rights practices can be discerned among the Contracting
States. Where a majority of states have expanded the scope of a right
guaranteed by the Convention or broadened the class of individuals to
whom it applies, the Court and Commission have been far more likely to
find that a state has violated the Convention by enacting or retaining a
20
law which restricts that particular right.
B.

Elements of the Consensus Inquiry

Although the tribunals have asserted in numerous cases that this European consensus approach is a "fact" of Convention jurisprudence, they
have been less than clear in defining the elements that are relevant to
discerning an emerging legal norm. As one commentator recently
lamented:
Especially vexing in any attempt to uncover the meaning of the consensus
factor is the consistently unsubstantiated nature of the Court's pronouncements. Each of these opinions relies upon the precedential value
of other opinions in which a European consensus, or lack thereof, figured
importantly, but a student of the Court is not informed as to how the
Court measures
the existence or non-existence of any one particular
21
consensus.
19. Perhaps the best definition of the deference inherent in the margin of appreciation doctrine can be found in an argument of the president of the Commission
before the Court:
The concept of the margin of appreciation is that a Government's discharge
of [its] responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest;
and that, once the Commission or the Court is satisfied that the Government's appreciation is at least on the margin of [its] powers .

. . ,

then the

interest which the public itself has in effective government and in the maintenance of orderjustifies and requires a decision in favour of the legality of the
Government's appreciation.
Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1960-61).
20. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Denmark, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1984) (degree
of scrutiny the Court applies to domestic laws varies according to the existence of
"common ground between the laws of the Contracting States"); see also Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and InternationalJudicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative
Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HAS'rNGs L.J. 805, 860 (1990) ("the
Court [has] declared that Convention standards ... evolve with general European
law reform trends regardless of whether a particular country ha[s] altered its own
national laws") (citing Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1978));
Warbrick, supra note 7, at 716 ("The Court can find objective support for its judgments which drag along the reluctant State, where for reasons of local prejudice,
inertia, even for conscious cost allocation reasons, the State has not kept up with the
European understanding of the fundamental right.").
21. Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of
European Human Rights Jurisprudence,3 CONN.J. INT'L L. 11, 158 (1987).
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A comprehensive survey of the tribunals' judgments, however,
reveals that, broadly speaking, the Court and Commission rely on three
distinct factors as evidence of consensus: legal consensus, as demonstrated by European domestic statutes, 22 international treaties, 23 and
regional legislation; 24 expert consensus; 25 and European public
26
consensus.
22. See, e.g., Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1988) (recognizing
statutory developments regarding sodomy laws as evidence of consensus); F. v. Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1987) (same, for laws temporarily prohibiting remarriage after divorce); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 23-24 (1981) (same, for sodomy laws); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 19-20 (1979) (same, for laws disadvantaging non-marital families); Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1978) (same, for use of corporal punishment against school children).
23. See, e.g., Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1990)
(citing European Convention on Transfrontier Television, May 5, 1989, Europ. T.S.
No. 132); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1987) (citing European
Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock, Oct. 15, 1975,
Europ. T.S. No. 85); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979) (citing
Convention Concerning the Establishment of Maternal Filiation of Children Born
Out of Wedlock, Sept. 12, 1962, 932 U.N.T.S. 73).
24. In this Article, the term "regional legislation" refers to the work product of
the legislative and executive branches of the Council of Europe. Although the resolutions and recommendations of these institutions do not bind the Contracting
States, they are a cogent expression of developing regional views concerning human
rights.
For examples of cases citing to regional legislation as evidence of consensus, see,
e.g., Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1990) (citing Recommendation of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe urging additional
human rights protection for transsexuals); McVeigh v. United Kingdom, App. No.
8022/77, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 71, 97 (1983) (Commission report) (citing Recommendation of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the importance of
controlling the international movement of terrorists in Europe).
25. See Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). In
Winterwerp, the Court construed the words "persons of unsound mind" for purposes
of Article 5(1)(e), which outlines the right to liberty. The Court noted that the
phrase's meaning "was continually evolving as research in psychiatry progresses."
Id. at 16; see also F. v. Switzerland, 128 Eu. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1987) (citing Swiss
Committee of Experts on Family Law Reform as evidence that a law temporarily
prohibiting remarriage after divorce is incompatible with the Convention); Marckx v.
Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1979) (referring to the opinion of lawyers
opposed to discrimination against non-marital families); X. v. Federal Republic of
Germany, App. No. 5935/72, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46, 56 (1976) (referring to German psychological and sociological studies relating to homosexual
behavior).
26. See, e.g., Ozturk v. Federal Republic of Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
36 (1984) (Bernhardt, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court has in many cases accepted and
practised an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, taking into account developments in society and in public opinion."); Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1979) ("[An increasing flexibility ... is developing [regarding) society's attitude to mental illness . . . so that a greater understanding of the
problems of mental patients is becoming more widespread."); Marckx v. Belgium, 31
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1979) (noting the Belgian government's assertion that
public sentiment increasingly favors ending discrimination against children born out
of wedlock).
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Although these elements appear with some regularity in Convention case law, the tribunals have yet to clarify the relative weight that
they should be given in determining the presence or absence of an
evolving European viewpoint. For example, the Court and the Commission have not specified what percentage of the Contracting States must
alter their laws before a right-enhancing norm will achieve consensus
status. Nor have they defined the degree to which international treaties
and regional legislation are relevant to their analysis.
Rather, the tribunals speak in vague generalities, noting that a
state's margin of appreciation varies according to "the existence or nonexistence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting
States." 27 The Court and Commission are equally ambiguous when
examining the consensus factors themselves, referring to "developments and commonly accepted standards" 28 and "modern trends;"' 29 or
noting that the relevant
reforms amount to an "evolution" 0 or a
"marked change"' s in the Contracting States' conception of human
rights; or that a "great majority" 3 2 or a "great number"3 3 of states have
altered their laws.
II.

Jurisprudential Problems with the Consensus Inquiry

One might view this lack of precision as an unremarkable result of the
Court's young age (thirty years) and its limited number of judgments
(approximately 250 by the end of 1992). Indeed, it seems plausible that
as the Court's case load increases, it will have many opportunities to
refine the consensus inquiry. But more is at stake here than underdeveloped doctrine. For the consensus methodology is one of the primary
tools available for both the Court and Commission to implement the
Convention's object and purpose: the protection of individual rights in
light of the common European heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedoms, and the rule of law.3 4 By allowing the level of rights-protection to evolve with progressive regional standards, the tribunals ensure
that their interpretation of protected rights and freedoms is "consistent
with 'the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to
27. Rasmussen v. Denmark, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1984).
28. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1978).
29. Ozturk v. Federal Republic of Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1984)
(Bernhardt, J., dissenting).

30. F. v. Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1987); Marckx v. Belgium,
31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979).
31. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1988); Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1981).
32. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1981).
33. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1986) (quoting preamble
to European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock, Oct.
15, 1975, Europ. T.S. No. 85).
34. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1975).
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maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society.' ,,5
This commitment to protecting individual rights is, however, in

constant tension with deference to national decision-makers. Therefore,
the tribunals must develop persuasive justifications for intruding into
the Contracting States' sovereignty. Indeed, if the Court and Commission expect the states to comply with their increasingly rights-protective

judgments, they must provide a more precise explanation of the point at
which an evolving European viewpoint acquires consensus status.
A.

The Tension Between Precedent and Change

With greater consistency and a more principled approach, the tribunals'
practice of treating their prior judgments as authoritative is given
enhanced legitimacy. Although the tribunals are not constrained by stare

decisis, they "usually follow and appl[y their] own precedents, such a
course being in the interests of legal certainty and the orderly development of Convention case-law." 6 Since precedent is applied on an interstate basis, a judgment against one Contracting State will be37extremely

persuasive in a similar factual context against another state.

When the tribunals articulate a rights-protective interpretation of

the Convention based on the consensus inquiry, they put other less progressive states on notice that their laws may no longer be compatible

with the Convention if their nationals were to challenge them. Although
such states may assert that special circumstances in their countries

require a different result, in the face of principled and methodical decision-making they will be hard-pressed to articulate a compelling argu-

38
ment, particularly as a greater degree of unity builds across Europe.

Thus, when the Court and Commission overrule their previous case law

"in order to ensure that the interpretation of the Convention reflects
societal changes and remains in line with present-day conditions," 3409 in
effect they constrain the sovereignty of all Convention signatories.

35. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1989) (quoting
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen & Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) at 27
(1976)).
36. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1988) (finding
challenge to sodomy laws of Republic of Ireland "indistinguishable" from prior challenge in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), to similar
laws in Northern Ireland);Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1986)
(relying on reasoning of Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), that all
states must take affirmative measures to respect family life).
38. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1990) (Martens,
J., dissenting).
39. Id at 14.
40. An example of this sovereignty-limiting effect can be seen in the recent
debate over repealing the sodomy laws of the Isle of Man. Since at present the Isle of
Man does not recognize the right of individual petition for its residents, the laws
cannot be declared in violation of the Convention by the Court or Commission
absent a complaint by another Contracting State (a relatively rare event in the Convention's history). Nevertheless, the British government has attempted to persuade a
very resistant Manx Parliament to amend its criminal code to bring it in line with the
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This broad sovereignty-limiting aspect of the tribunals' decisions
argues strongly in favor of a carefully reasoned approach to consensus
definition.4 1 For if the Contracting States' reliance on a previously valid
interpretation of the Convention is to be outweighed by the need to
update the provisions enshrined in the treaty, those states that have not
participated in the formation of a particular regional norm must have at
least some confidence in the tribunals' reasoning. Indeed, such states
will have a forceful argument against implementing a judgment where
they perceive uncertainty or arbitrariness in the manner in which the
42
Court and Commission have applied the consensus inquiry.
B.

Finding a Proper "European" Interpretation

Underlying the tension between adhering to precedent and recognizing
change is the tribunals' apprehension over whether they should strive to
create an autonomous European interpretation of the Convention
rather than a body of unrelated precedents that simply reflect European
state practice in discrete subject areas. 43 The tension between these
approaches is at the heart of the consensus methodology, which serves
very different functions depending on which jurisprudential view is
adopted.
At one extreme, the Court and Commission can be seen as a lens
through which the existing practices of the Contracting States are
reflected. Under this approach, there is little or no room for the tribunals to modernize the Convention on behalf of the states. Rather, they
raise the level of human rights protection in accordance with evolving
European norms only where almost all states have adopted the rightsenhancing measures and where it seems apparent that other states have
considered reforms and are likely to follow. In the most extreme scenario, the tribunals simply recognize the de facto legal changes that have
occurred in all states and then incorporate them into the Convention.
Court's rulings that such laws violate a homosexual's right to privacy. See Keep Ban on
Homosexuality, Say Manx MPs, Assoc.

PRESS NEWSFILE,

Feb. 27, 1991 (available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt file). In the Spring of 1992, the Parliament finally
relented. See Manx MPs Vote to LegaliseHomosexuality,

THE INDEPENDENT, Apr.

1, 1992,

at 2.
41. Of course, the Convention guarantees every Contracting State the right to
litigate a potential Convention violation, even one that appears to be compelled by
precedent. See Convention, supra note I, art. 48 (Contracting State against which
petition has been filed may appeal Commission decision to Court).
42. See Mahoney, supra note 5, at 76-77 ("Stability in the interpretation and appli-

cation of the Convention is highly desirable if not even essential. Without such stability, the credibility of the Court and the Convention system as a whole would
suffer."); Warbrick, supra note 9, at 1096 (When the Court "keep[s] its interpretation

abreast of developments .... it is incumbent upon it to give a coherent justification
for the steps it has taken: States need to know where they stand, and so do potential
applicants.").
43. See Yourow, supra note 21, at 158 (noting that it is unclear "whether the Court
creates a truly autonomous law of the Convention in its own case law, or whether the
laws and practices of the Member States ... actually define the international or European jurisprudence").
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Such a position requires little theoretical44 reasoning and poses only a
minimal threat to the Court's legitimacy.
At the other extreme, the Court and Commission play a far more
aggressive role, highlighting and refining emerging norms and striving
to develop a truly pan-European approach. Such activist tribunals might
begin to incorporate a newly emerging principle of rights-protection at
any time after a significant number of states had modified their domestic
laws, with the justifications for judicial intervention growing as more
states joined the reform movement. As the degree of European homogeneity increased, the Court and Commission would not allow any state
to rely on special circumstances to prevent the formation of a uniform
standard.
The tribunals have avoided both of these poles, choosing instead to
weigh the need for common standards against the Contracting States'
desire to chart a nonconformist course of human rights compliance. In
Cossey v. United Kingdom,45 Judge Martens concisely articulated the
importance of balancing these two concerns. Arguing in favor of a uniform European approach, he noted that
the preamble to the Convention, which recalls the aim of achieving
greater unity between member States and stresses that Fundamental
Freedoms are "best maintained" by a "common understanding and observance of... Human Rights," seems to invite the Court to develop common standards. To the extent that the number of member States
increases, this side of the Court's mandate gains in weight, for in such a
'larger, diversified community the development of common standards may
ensuring that the Convenwell prove the best, if not the only way 4of...
6
tion remains a living instrument .... "
Yet the judge also underscored the need for a wider degree of deference
in certain contexts:
Judicial self-restraint may, on the other hand, be called for by the special
features of the case or the fact that it cannot be decided without taking
into consideration special situations obtaining in the defendant State. If,
after careful consideration, the Court is convinced that the latter is really
the case, then4 7it may be that the State should be left a certain margin of
appreciation.
44. It should be noted, however, that even this conservative approach to the consensus inquiry is a departure from traditional principles of treaty construction, which
require an express intention by states to limit their sovereignty. See Warbrick, supra
note 7, at 709.
45. 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
46. Id. at 28 (Martens, J., dissenting); see also Barfod v. Denmark, 149 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1989) (G61ciiklii,J., dissenting) ("I wish to stress that it is difficult
to reconcile the Convention, whose ultimate purpose is to establish European standards, with specific national features such as those put forward by the Government."); vAN DUK & vAN HoOF, supra note 7, at 602-03 (arguing that tribunals should
search for and elaborate common standards for interpreting the Convention). But see
MERRILLS, supra note 2, at 74 (noting danger ofjudicial illegitimacy where tribunals
"encourage or promote a tendency which has yet to become firmly established").
47. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1990) (Martens,
J., dissenting).
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To determine an appropriate degree of deference and judicial selfrestraint in specific cases, the Court and Commission have supplemented the consensus inquiry with an understanding of the shifting and
context-based nature of a Contracting State's margin of appreciation.
As the tribunals have astutely observed, a state's interest in policies or
practices that conflict with developing legal norms is likely to vary with
the specific human right at issue and with the objectives that are served
by restricting the enjoyment of that right.48 Thus, where states demonstrate the existence of diverse approaches to protecting a Convention
right or where they have challenged the tribunals' proficiency to adjudicate a particular class of disputes, the Court and Commission have
granted states discretion to restrict individual rights within widely set
parameters. 49 By contrast, where a common interpretive perspective
exists, where a Convention article contains especially stringent rightsprotective language, or where a right serves a special function in democratic societies, the tribunals have scrutinized such restrictions with a
"more extensive European supervision."' 50
48. See Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1987) (margin of
appreciation varies with the nature of the restriction asserted and the nature of the
goal pursued by the Contracting State); Gillow v. United Kingdom, 109 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 22 (1986) (margin of appreciation "will depend not only on the nature of
the aim of the restriction but also on the nature of the right involved"); see also Strossen, supra note 20, at 857 ("The Convention tribunals have stated that national government decision-makers are entitled to more deference ... regarding certain kinds
of decisions that are traditionally consigned to a particular community's power of
self-determination.").
49. In Muller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), the Court, after
noting that "conceptions of sexual morality have changed in recent years," stated:
[I]t is not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Contracting
States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken of the
requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place,
especially in our era, characterised as it is by a far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content
of these requirements as well as on the necessity of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them.

Id at 22; see also Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
23 (1987) (manner in which Contracting States hold free elections given broad discretion); James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1986) (Contracting States have wide margin of appreciation to regulate private property in the
public interest).
50. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1979); see
also Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1989) ("Th[e]
absolute prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment under the terms of the Convention shows that Article 3 enshrines one of the
fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.");
Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38
(1985) (requiring "very weighty reasons" to support differential treatment based on
gender since "advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the
member States of the Council of Europe"); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981) (requiring Contracting States to advance "particularly serious reasons" for an interference with "a most intimate aspect of private life");
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976) (noting that
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III. Consensus Incongruity in Recent Cases Relating to Family Law and
Gender Issues
It is against the backdrop of this contextual approach that the tribunals
have struggled to build a coherent jurisprudential vision. As they have
filled in the interstices of the Convention's text with an increasingly rich
and complex case law, areas in which states might once have claimed
authority for a nonconformist position have been eroded by the development of common standards. But the Court and Commission have
been less than clear in explaining why certain settings require earlier
recognition of emerging consensus principles whereas others demand a
more circumspect approach. Nowhere has this ambiguity been more
apparent than in human rights claims relating to the structure of the
family, gender equality, and transsexualism. 5 1
A. Family Life and Gender Equality Cases
In F. v. Switzerland,5 2 for example, the Court reviewed a Swiss statute
that imposed a temporary waiting period for remarriage after a divorce.
In deciding whether the law violated the right to marry enshrined in
Article 12, the Court referred to the rules governing remarriage in other
Contracting States. Although by the mid-1980s every other state had
repealed the temporary waiting period, the Court stated that this should
not be viewed as prima fade proof that the Convention had been
breached. Rather, it stressed that
the fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds itself in an
isolated position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that that aspect offends the Convention, particularly in a
field-matrimony-which is so closely bound up with the cultural and historical traditions of each society and its deep-rooted ideas about the family unit. 53
This passage notwithstanding, the Court held in a nine to eight decision
that the Swiss law violated Article 12, rendering ambiguous the persua54
sive value of its assertion.
"[f]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations" of a democratic society and "one of the basic conditions for [society's] progress and for the
development of every man"); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
17 (1975) ("The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted
to a judge ranks as one of the universally 'recognized' fundamental principles of

law.").
51. Although these areas of European human rights law provide the clearest

examples of consensus ambiguity, a similar analysis can be made of the tribunals'
freedom of expression and social insurance benefit cases. For a discussion of the
doctrinal difficulties that these cases present, see Warbrick, supra note 7, at 711-14;
Warbrick, supra note 9, at 1084-85.

52. 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).
53. Id at 16-17.
54. Id. at 20. The dissenters appear not to have addressed the consensus inquiry,
advocating instead a textual approach to marriage rights:
With regard to marriage, the State has more extensive powers than in some
other fields. This is particularly apparent when one compares the very brief
and non-exhaustive reference to 'national laws' in Article 12 of the Conven-
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The deferential approach to family law articulated in F. v. Switzerland
seems to imply that the tribunals grant a wide margin of appreciation to
states whenever these issues arise. This is not an accurate picture of
Convention jurisprudence, however. In several recent cases, the Court
has required states to treat non-marital families with the same degree of
respect as traditional families. In reaching the conclusion that the Convention fully protects non-marital relationships, the Court has relied on
regional treaties and domestic law reforms as evidence of a consensus
evolution.5 5 Indeed, in Inze v. Austria,56 the Court went so far as to state
that "[v]ery weighty reasons would . . .have to be advanced before a
difference of treatment on the ground of birth out of wedlock could be
57
regarded as compatible with the Convention."
In the area of gender equality the tribunals have applied an equally
exacting standard of review. In Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United
Kingdom,58 the Court's claim that the "advancement of the equality of
the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of
Europe" allowed it to demand "very weighty reasons" from the respondent state for maintaining an immigration policy that discriminated on
the basis of sex.5 9 The unanimous judgment is significant for its forward-looking interpretation of the consensuis inquiry. Although the
Contracting States had ratified several multilateral treaties to protect
women, their domestic legislation fell short of ensuring equality
between the sexes. 60 This deficiency did not dissuade the tribunals from
developing a rights-protective approach to gender issues based on
states' international aspirations rather than their domestic actions.
B.

Transsexualism Cases

Perhaps the most troublesome issue in which the consensus inquiry has
played a key role has been the claim by transsexuals to full legal recognition of their desired gender. Such cases have required the tribunals to
analyze scientific evidence on biological, psychological, and surgically
acquired gender identity, and have challenged them to develop an adequate response to a human rights problem that the Convention's drafters did not envision. The tribunals have relied heavily on legal and
expert consensus to determine whether a state's refusal to permit a postoperative transsexual to alter his or her official documents and to marry
tion with the more circumscribed and restrictive wording of the second paragraph of each of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Id. at 22 (joint dissenting opinion).
55. SeeJohnston v. Ireland, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29-31 (1986); Marckx v.
Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-19 (1979).
56. 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).

57. Id. at 18.
58. 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).

59. Id. at 38.
60. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTs LAw-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 55
& n.9 (1986) (citing Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers as evidence of
existing gender inequality in European domestic laws).
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according to his or her desired identity violates the Convention. 6 1
The remarkable aspect of the tribunals' case law concerning
transsexualism is the degree of disharmony existing among the members of the Commission and the judges of the Court. In three separate
instances, the Commission held that a state had violated the Convention
62
by failing to grant legal recognition to a transsexual's new identity,
only to have the Court reverse those decisions on appeal. When the
Court finally found a violation of the right to respect for private life, it
did so in a convoluted judgment 63 that created substantial rifts among
the jurists over how to approach future cases concerning transsexualism.
More importantly, the decision compounded the confusion regarding
the tribunals' proper role in balancing respect for precedent against the
application of a consensus-based methodology.
1.

Rees v. United Kingdom

The first detailed analysis of these problematic questions appeared in
Rees v. United Kingdom,6 4 where the Court, by a twelve to three vote, concluded that the government's failure to modify its birth registration system to accommodate transsexuals did not violate their right to respect
for private life. The Court considered several factors in reaching this
result. First, it noted that the United Kingdom had taken no official
steps to recognize Rees' surgically acquired male gender. As a consequence, when he was asked to produce his birth certificate for employment or other purposes, it indicated that he was biologically female.
The United Kingdom also considered Rees to be a woman for purposes
of marriage, pension benefits, and certain employment rights. 65 By contrast, because the United Kingdom, unlike many civil-law Contracting
States, did not maintain an integrated civil status register, Rees was able
to change his name and was issued a passport that reflected his chosen
name and gender. Although such modifications were not designed specifically to accommodate transsexuals, the Court indicated that they mit66
igated the interference with Rees' private life.
The Court also rejected Rees' request to amend the birth register
and to require the United Kingdom to issue an updated birth certificate.
The Court concluded that to protect Rees' privacy effectively, the
amendment would have to be kept confidential from most third parties.
Such secrecy would fundamentally alter the public nature of the registra61. See Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); Rees v.
United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
62. See Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, (to be printed in 174 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (199-) (Commission Report)); Rees v. United Kingdom, 89 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1991) (Commission Report); Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 36 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1979-80) (Commission Report).
63. B. v. France, App. No. 13,343/87, slip op. (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 25, 1992) (to
be printed in 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)).
64. 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
65. Id. at 16.

66. Id.
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tion system and would also cause complications in the administration of
67
family and inheritance laws.
The Court bolstered its conclusion by analyzing the legal status of
transsexuals in other European nations. Although noting that "[s]everal
States" had given transsexuals the option of altering their official documents to fit their new gender, the Court concluded "that there is at present little common ground between the Contracting States in this area
and that, generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional
stage." 68 Accordingly, it granted the United Kingdom a "wide margin
of appreciation." 6 9 In a key passage, however, the Court suggested that
Rees would not be its last word on the subject:
[T]he Court is conscious of the seriousness of the problems affecting
[transsexuals] and the distress they suffer. The Convention has always to
be interpreted and applied in the light of current circumstances. The
need for appropriate legal measures should therefore be kept under
review having
regard particularly to scientific and societal
70
developments.
The Court's generalized formulation of the consensus inquiry created a substantial measure of ambiguity over when new developments
would compel a reconsideration of its deferential approach to these
issues. It also placed the United Kingdom in a position of uncertainty
regarding the compatibility of its laws with the Convention, highlighting
the fact that its future human rights obligations would be redefined
based on changing practices in other European states.
From the perspective of enhancing the jurisprudential goals discussed above-the desire for legal stability, the interstate precedential
value of prior judgments, and the need to modernize the rights
enshrined in the Convention-the Court could have remained vague
about the consensus inquiry had it not been required to reexamine its
analysis in Rees until significant legal developments had occurred in
European society. In that event, the Court could have found a violation
of the Convention after noting the "marked changes" or "evolution" in
state practice concerning transsexualism. If, however, the Court were
required to reconsider its analysis and possibly overrule Rees after only
minor changes had occurred in legal and expert consensus, these goals
would risk being undermined unless the Court specified the developments that had occurred and explained why they required a different
conclusion. But it is precisely at this point in the process of consensus
evolution that reexamination of the issue would pose the most serious
challenge to the authority of the Court and to its competing jurisprudential mandates.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
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Cossey v. United Kingdom

Unfortunately, such an unhappy state of affairs presented itselfjust four
years later. In Cossey v. United Kingdom, 7 1 the Court reexamined the legal
rights of transsexuals, noting rather cryptically that "[t]here have been
certain developments since 1986" in the laws of some of the Contracting
States. 7 2 It also referred to a Resolution on Discrimination Against
Transsexuals 73 authored by the European Parliament and to Recommendation 1117 on the Condition of Transsexuals adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 74 Although these
documents called for additional legal protection for transsexuals, they
also acknowledged the existing "diversity of practice" across Europe. 75
Therefore, the Court construed the regional legislation as an invitation
to European states to harmonize their laws, rather than evidence of a
consensus evolution. Accordingly, it held by a ten to eight vote that the
United Kingdom had not violated Cossey's private life, although, as in
76
Rees, it reaffirmed the need to review the issue in future cases.
While on the surface the Court's analysis appears persuasive, four
dissenting opinions effectively undercut the majority's reasoning by
challenging its approach to the consensus inquiry. 77 These dissents
examined recent legal and societal developments with a precision not
found in prior cases. In addition to citing the specific statutes that had
been enacted since Rees, the dissents also noted that several states had
provided official acknowledgement of surgically acquired gender
through judicial or administrative proceedings. 78 Thus, while the manner in which a post-operative transsexual's identity was recognized
varied from state to state, some form of legal recognition of gender reassignment surgery was possible in fourteen Contracting States. This
71. 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
72. Id. at 16.
73. 1989 O.J. (C 256) 33, cited in Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 16 (1990).
74. Recommendation 1117, Eur. Parl. Ass., 41st Sess. (1989), cited in Cossey v.
United Kingdom 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1990).
75. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1990). Both
documents urged European states to ban discrimination against transsexuals and to
facilitate legal recognition of their acquired gender by permitting name and sex modifications on birth certificates and other identity documents. See id. at 43 (Palm,
Foighel, and Pekkanen, JJ., dissenting).
76. Id. at 17-18 ("Since the Convention always has to be interpreted and applied
in light of current circumstances, it is important that the need for appropriate legal
measures in this area should be kept under review."). The Court also held by a vote
of fourteen to four that the United Kingdom has not breached Article 12 by refusing
to permit Cossey to marry a man. It reasoned that "attachment to the traditional
concept of marriage provides sufficient reason for the continued adoption of biological criteria for determining a person's sex for purposes of marriage, this being a matter encompassed within the power of the Contracting States to regulate by national
law the exercise of the right to marry." Id. at 18.
77. Id. at 20 (Bindschedler-Robert and Russo, JJ., dissenting in part); id. at 21
(Macdonald and Spielmann,JJ., dissenting in part); id. at 22-41 (Martens, J., dissenting); id. at 42-44 (Palm, Foighel, and Pekkanen, JJ., dissenting).
78. E.g., id. at 35 (Martens, J., dissenting).

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 26

number far exceeded the number of states-five-that had modified
79
their domestic laws four years earlier.
The dissenting judges also took exception to the majority's interpretation of the regional legislation. Whereas the Court viewed these
documents as evidence of a lack of common ground among the Contracting States, the dissent argued that "[t]he decisions of these representative organs clearly indicate that, according to prevailing public
opinion, transsexuals should have the right to have their new sexual
identity fully recognised by the law." 8 0° In the dissenting judges' belief,
this increase in public sympathy, combined with the developing legal
consensus, was sufficient to require states such as the United Kingdom
to reform their laws.
3. B. v. France
After the divisive debate in Cossey, at least one judge believed that the
tribunals would avoid re-examining the rights of transsexuals for several
years. 8 1 The need for an orderly development of Convention case law
argued strongly against re-examination, as did the Contracting States'
desire for repose and legal stability. Yet only eighteen months later, the
Court for the first time in its history held, by a fifteen to six vote, that the
Convention's right to respect for private life compels a state with an
integrated civil status registration system to recognize a transsexual's
surgically-acquired gender. The case, B. v. France,8 2 did little to resolve
the methodological debate among the judges concerning the proper
role of the consensus inquiry and the precedential worth of prior judgments. In fact, the Court appears to have muddied the theoretical
waters even further: although purporting to distinguish Cossey and Rees,
a majority of the judges (including all the dissenters in both cases)85 cast
substantial doubt on the validity of those judgments and the interpretive
approach they embody.
Although B., a male to female transsexual, had urged the Court to
reconsider and overrule its prior case law, the Court rejected this invitation, concluding that, with respect to scientific and legal developments,
"there is as yet no sufficiently broad consensus between the member
States of the Council of Europe to persuade the Court to reach opposite
79. Id. at 35-36; see also id. at 21 (Macdonald and Spielmann, JJ., dissenting in
part) ("[S]ince 1986 there have been, in the law of many of the member States of the
Council of Europe, not 'certain developments' but clear developments.").
80. Id. at 43 (Palm, Foighel, and Pekkanen, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 36 (Martens,J., dissenting) (arguing that regional legislation evidences "a marked increase in
public acceptance of transsexualism").
81. Id. at 34 (Martens, J., dissenting) (noting that "confirming that judgment
[Rees] would bar overruling for a long time to come").
82. App. No. 13,343/87, slip op. (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 25, 1992) (to be printed in
232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)).
83. Judge Gersing died prior to the judgment in Cossey v. United Kingdom.
Judge Foighel did not participate in the judgment in B. v. France.
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conclusions to those in its Rees and Cossey judgments." 84 Rather, the
Court made a narrow fact-based evaluation of French law without
expressly reconsidering the broader principles expressed in its earlier
judgments. The Court relied on several factors to distinguish the legal
status of French transsexuals from that of their British counterparts.
First, France, unlike the United Kingdom, maintained an integrated
system for registering the civil status of its nationals. This system
allowed a birth certificate to be updated throughout a person's life to
record such events as adoption, marriage, and divorce.8 5 The information in the certificate was used to compile various identity and travel
documents, some of which contained a reference to gender.8 6 In addition, France did not permit individuals to change their forenames at will.
Rather, the name given on a child's birth certificate was conclusive and
could only be altered by a court order upon the showing of a "legitimate
interest." 8 7 The Court noted that these constraints imposed a substantial burden upon transsexuals, who "could consequently not cross a
frontier, undergo an identity check or carry out one of the many transactions of daily life where proof of identity is necessary, without disclosing
88
the discrepancy between their legal sex and their apparent sex."
The fact that this situation could be remedied without detailed legislation also swayed the Court. The French civil status system was
already equipped to record amendments to a birth certificate; therefore
a court order altering a transsexual's gender could be easily entered "to
bring the document up to date so as to reflect the applicant's present
position." 8 9 Moreover, the limited access to civil status documents
that the modification would
already required by French law ensured
90
remain confidential for most purposes.
These factors, viewed in isolation, provide a compelling justification
for distinguishing the British birth registration system and holding
France in breach of the Convention. Indeed, the Court was careful to
reaffirm its view that the British system was still compatible with the
Convention. 9 1 A more careful assessment of the judgment, however,
reveals the theoretical implausibility of separating the two strands of
reasoning. Specifically, the Court's efforts to move the Convention forward while reaffirming Rees and Cossey are undermined by the fact that
France, unlike the United Kingdom, had begun to fashion an official
response to the legal problems associated with transsexualism.
During the past ten years French courts had, in numerous judgments, ordered the birth certificates and identity documents of transsex84.
20.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

B. v. France, App. No. 13,343/87, slip op. (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 25, 1992) at

Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

10.
23.
22.
21.
20.
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uals to be altered to conform to the persons' outward appearance. In
cases such as B.'s, where the courts denied these orders, they reasoned
that the individuals concerned had not received their surgery in French
public hospitals after undergoing properly documented medical and
psychological treatment. The courts utilized these criteria to limit civil
status modifications to persons who could demonstrate the "irreversible
necessity" of gender reassignment surgery. 9 2
While acknowledging the availability of this judicial remedy, the
Court found that French law failed to give sufficient weight to B.'s personal decision to abandon the sex of her birth through hormone therapy
and surgery. 93 What is remarkable about this conclusion is the Court's
willingness to second-guess the French courts on the issue of which
transsexuals have the right to have their gender change acknowledged in
the law, while simultaneously asserting that psychological and medical
research on the nature of transsexualism remains largely unsettled. 94
Although this reference to a lack of consensus pays lip service to the
Cossey and Rees precedents, the Court sharply undercut the analytical
underpinnings that gave those judgments their jurisprudential force.
For despite the absence of common ground, the Court effectively preempted the ability of the French courts to decide not the more fundamental question of whether a transsexual's civil status should be altered,
but the more narrow issue of the conditions under which such a modification should be made. Such an intrusive action repudiates the rationale
of deference articulated in Cossey and Rees and allows the Court to substitute its own judgment for that of national decision-makers.
The six dissenting judges in B. v. France highlighted the Court's
inability to distinguish its precedents. Four of the dissenting judges
stated that the Court had flatly overruled its prior case law,9 5 whereas
the remaining two judges believed that the judgment was susceptible to
such an interpretation.9 6 But far more troubling to the dissenting
judges than the instability created by this sudden change in the law was
the grave threat to the Court's legitimacy posed by a substantial expansion of the right to respect for private life without a carefully reasoned
92. Id at 6.
93. Stated the Court:

It is true that the applicant underwent the surgical operation abroad, without
the benefit of all the medical and psychological safeguards which are now
required in France. The operation nevertheless involved the irreversible
abandonment of the external marks of Miss B.'s original sex. The Court considers that in the circumstances of the case the applicant's manifest determination is a factor which is sufficiently significant to be taken into account,
together with other factors, with reference to Article 8.

Id. at 22.
94. See id. at 20 ("[Tlhere still remains some uncertainty as to the essential nature

of transsexualism and that the legitimacy of surgical intervention in such cases is
sometimes questioned.").
95. Id. at 30 (Pinheiro Farinha, J., dissenting); id. at 36 (Valticos, J., dissenting);
id. at 41-42 (Morenilla, J., dissenting). Judge Loizou approved Judge Valticos's dissenting opinion.
96. Id. at 29 (Matscher, J., dissenting); id. at 32 (Pettiti, J., dissenting).
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approach to the consensus inquiry. Judge Valticos expressed these fears
openly:
By overturning a line of case-law whose most recent decision was
scarcely a year old-even though the facts, albeit different to a certain
extent, were not in my opinion different enough to justify this change of
direction-I fear that the majority of the Court could be opening the way
to serious and as yet unforeseeable consequences....
No doubt there is an evolution taking place, in people's minds and in
science; ... but it seems to me that as matters stand it is clearly inappropriate to consider that there has been a violation of the Convention where
for legal, moral and scientific reasons, reasons which all deserve respect, a
State does not follow, or at least is not yet ready to follow such an evolution. The countries of Europe as a whole
do not appear to be ready to
97
have such case-law imposed on them.
In a similar vein, Judge Pettiti chastised the majority for failing to
respect France's judicial method of modifying civil status documents in
accordance with well-defined medical conditions. The judge noted that
France occupied a middle ground between those Contracting States that
had afforded complete legal recognition to transsexuals and those
nations that had made no response whatsoever to the problem. In his
view, this diversity permitted states to choose "between the legislative
path and the case-law path" and to base "the criteria for recognition of
. . . transsexualism . . . upon undisputed scientific knowledge." 9 8 By
failing to respect France's decision, he stated, the Court had ignored the
margin of appreciation granted to states in unsettled areas of human
rights law that involve "moral attitudes and traditions." 99
C.

The Transsexualism Cases' Legacy of Confusion for
Future Applications of the Consensus Inquiry

Cossey v. United Kingdom and B. v. Franceare watershed cases for the European consensus inquiry. The deep divisions among the judges over the
human rights of transsexuals had three significant consequences for the
developing doctrine. First, they forced the judges to articulate more
precisely their competing visions of how to balance the protection of
individual rights against deference to national decision-makers; second,
they engendered an extremely candid debate over the relative weight
accorded to the elements supporting the consensus inquiry; and finally,
they compelled the tribunals to evaluate the precedential force that their
prior case law should exert in the face of a rapidly evolving regional
perspective on human rights.
The Court's sharply divided voting patterns enhance the significance of these judgments. Cases in which the majority and dissent split
over difficult questions of consensus methodology compel the judges to
clarify their conflicting views on the manner in which emerging norms
97. Id. at 36-37 (Valticos,J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 33 (PettitiJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 35.
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should be incorporated into the Convention. These cases provide
clearer insights into the jurists' reasoning than cases in which the Court
is able to muster a very large majority and can therefore remain equivocal about the state of consensus evolution, either by failing to explain its
analysis fully or by using evidence selectively.
The ad seriatim snapshots of consensus progression which cases like
Rees, Cossey, and B. v. France take at particular historical moments allow
scholars to calculate exactly how far European human rights law has
evolved. Litigants before the Court and Commission will now debate
whether these cases should serve as benchmarks for determining when
other emerging human rights principles should crystalize into binding
legal norms.10 0 They will also discuss the content and scope of such
norms by using increasingly precise evidence, including legislative,
administrative, and judicial actions, to demonstrate that a threshold percentage of states have modified their laws. In the face of such precision,
the Court may find it difficult to maintain an authoritative ad hoc
approach.
In fact, it is the specificity of the dissent's consensus analysis in Cossey that erodes the Court's ability to rely on ambiguous reasoning in
other areas of Convention jurisprudence. For once having defined the
evolutive line with clarity, the failure to define it in other cases becomes
increasingly unconvincing. Much of the reasoning in B. v. France is
unpersuasive precisely because the Court did not adhere to its own prior
assessments of consensus evolution. By failing to account for the striking similarities to the earlier cases, as well as the apparent differences,
the Court leaves itself vulnerable to the charge that it manipulates the
consensus inquiry to achieve an interpretation of the Convention that it
finds ideologically pleasing.
Given these problems of interpretation, the Court and Commission
will likely be confronted with an increasing number of disputes in which
the proper role of the consensus inquiry will be hotly contested. If the
tribunals hope to maintain their institutional authority and balance their
opposing jurisprudential mandates, they must strive for greater coherence in applying the consensus methodology. While this may not always
result in cases being decided by large majorities, it will enable states and
individuals to predict with greater accuracy judicial responses to newly
emerging human rights principles.
IV.

A Revised Consensus Inquiry for the 1990s
As a first step toward jurisprudential harmony, I offer the following
interpretive approach to apply the European consensus inquiry. The
100. As to the elements that comprise the consensus inquiry, the majority's refusal
in Cossey to rely on regional legislation as evidence of a consensus evolution seems to
diminish the importance of international developments. But it stands in sharp contrast to cases like Abdulaziz and Marckx, where the Court gave significant weight to the
aspirations expressed on the international plane, even in the face of a somewhat
underdeveloped domestic response.
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proposal responds to the invitation by other scholars to develop a more
rigorous methodology for resolving consensus-based disputes. 1 1 It
attempts to synthesize the principles expressed in numerous cases into a
flexible framework that weighs the need for common standards to protect individual rights against deference to national decision-makers.
A. Textual and Structural Approaches
Although the consensus inquiry is a vital aspect of Convention jurisprudence, the controversies created by its application argue in favor of
using it as an interpretive tool only after structural or textual approaches
have been exhausted. Construing the plain meaning of individual articles, their relationship to one another in the Convention as a whole, and
where appropriate, writings and statements from the travauxpreparatoires,
may reveal a rights-inclusive or rights-limiting interpretation that,
because it is grounded on widely accepted principles of treaty construction, 10 2 will command large majorities on the Court and Commission.
Yet even where the jurists disagree over whether the existence of a
03
right can be implied from the Convention's object and purpose,
proper application of a structural or textual methodology provides
greater stability than application of the consensus inquiry. For once the
Court has ruled that an unenumerated right is not protected by the Convention, that interpretation will not be subject to reevaluation with the
emergence of rights-enhancing law reforms. 10 4 Rather, the tribunals
will respect the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court and allow
the Council of Europe to overrule the decision by promulgating an
optional Protocol to incorporate the right into the Convention's adjudicatory framework.' 0 5 In addition, a textual or structural method validates the use of the consensus inquiry by limiting it to those human
rights concepts that are explicit or implicit in the language of the Convention. A few examples from recent cases will help to illuminate these
points.
101. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 5, at 73, 83.

102. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/
Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, arts. 31-32.
103. The clearest example of such disagreement is found in Cruz Varas v. Sweden,
201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991). There, the Court split ten votes to nine over

whether the power to order interim measures could be implied from Article 25 § 1 of
the Convention, which prevents the Contracting States from hindering the effective
exercise of the right of petition. Id. at 38.

104. Id. at 36 ("Subsequent practice could be taken as establishing the agreement
of Contracting States regarding the interpretation of a Convention provision.., but

not to create new rights and obligations which were not included in the Convention
at the outset .... ) (citations omitted); Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1986) (joint dissenting opinion) ("An evolutive interpretation
allows variable and changing concepts already contained in the Convention to be
construed in the light of modern-day conditions, but it does not allow entirely new

concepts or spheres of application to be introduced into the Convention: that is a
legislative function that belongs to the member States of the Council of Europe.")
(citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1991).
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In Johnston v. Ireland,10 6 the Court concluded that Article 12,107
which guarantees the right to marry, could not be interpreted to include
the right to divorce. 10 8 The Court grounded its decision on the plain
meaning of the text and confirmed its reasoning by referring to the Convention's preparatory work, which indicated that the right to divorce had
been deleted from the original version of Article 12.109 This clear textual omission prevented a consensus-based interpretation of the Article,
as "the Court cannot, by means of an evolutive interpretation, derive
from these instruments a right that was not included therein at the
outset." 110
Similarly, in Soering v. United Kingdom,"' t the Court used an integrated interpretation of the Convention and its Protocols to reach the
conclusion that the Convention permits Contracting States to impose
the death penalty for certain crimes. 1 12 Amnesty International argued
before the Court that, because the majority of European states had formally abolished the death penalty, capital punishment was no longer
consistent with regional standards of justice and should properly be
viewed as inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of
Article 3.113 The Court rejected this consensus-based approach. It
relied instead on the existence of an optional Protocol 1 4 that abolished
the death penalty as evidence that the Convention permitted capital
punishment by those states that had chosen not to ratify the Protocol. 115
By contrast, in Colder v. United Kingdom, 116 the Court interpreted
Article 6, which guarantees fair public hearings by an impartial tribunal,
to include a right of access to the courts. Although this right was not
explicitly set forth in the text, the Court reasoned that "[i]t would be
106. 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).

107. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12 ("Men and women of marriageable age have
the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the
exercise of this right.").
108. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1986). For a critical
appraisal of this case, see Kathleen M. Dillon, Divorce and Remarriageas Human Rights:
The Irish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights at Odds in Johnston v.

Ireland, 22

CORNELL INT'L LJ. 63

(1989).

109. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1986).
110. Id. at 25.
111. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
112. Convention, supra note 1, art. 2, 1 ("Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.").
113. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1989).
114. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Europ. T.S.
No. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 539 (1983), arts. 1, 2.
115. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40-41 (1989). For
an argument that the division of rights between a Protocol and the Convention's
primary text poses especially complex and politically sensitive questions of interpretation, see Heifer, supra note 10, at 191-202 (discussing interaction between proposed sexual orientation Protocol and Articles 8 and 14 of Convention).
116. 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975).
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inconceivable.., that Article 6 [paragraph 1] should describe in detail
the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and
should not first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court."'1 17 The Court did
not develop this interpretive construction from the consensus inquiry.
Rather, it relied on "the very terms of the first sentence of Article 6
[paragraph 1] read in its context and having regard to the object and
purpose of the Convention... and to general principles of law." '1 s
B. The Consensus Continuum
In many if not most cases, however, textual or structural approaches will
not resolve the matter before the tribunals. For once they have determined that a particular right is protected by the Convention, they must
then define the contours of that right in light of evolving regional trends
in human rights. Rather than approach this analysis on an ad hoc basis,
the Court and Commission should search for such trends along a structured continuum that recognizes the importance of the Convention's
text, the extent of domestic law reforms, and the existence of international treaties and regional legislation in assisting the formation of a
common European perspective. At each stage along this continuum, the
Court and Commission can claim greater authority for accelerating the
process of consensus formation and creating a uniform rule of rightsprotection.
1.

The Text of the Convention

The Convention's text provides the most important starting point for
determining the role of the consensus inquiry in the Court's evolutionary jurisprudence. The language of specific articles and the relationship
between them should be understood as modifying the tribunals' power
to expand the protection of individual rights in Europe using a consensus-based methodology. The ability of the text either to authorize or to
circumscribe an evolutionary interpretation can best be grasped by
examining a spectrum of positions that illustrate the tribunals' varying
authority to impose a construction of the Convention based on shared
European values.
At one end of the spectrum are instances in which the Convention
expressly authorizes the Contracting States to limit the exercise of individual rights. For example, the language of Article 2 that permits the
use of the death penalty provides a seemingly absolute textual limit on
the Court's ability to interpret the more open-ended language of Article
3's prohibition against inhuman or degrading punishment. Yet in Soering v. United Kingdom, 119 the Court stated that even such a clear textual
restriction on an evolutionary interpretation could be overcome by sub117. Id. at 18.
118. Id.
119. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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sequent developments in the penal policies of the Contracting States. 12 0
In order for the death penalty to fall within the ambit of Article 3, however, the Court concluded that states had to be uniform both in their
rejection of capital punishment as an appropriate sanction for criminal
conduct and in their understanding of such actions as creating a binding
legal obligation to augment the Convention's text. Moreover, the Contracting States' ability to rewrite the Convention through subsequent
practices would cease to exist where the states had adopted what the
Court referred to as "the normal method of amendment of the text;"
that is, where they had drafted an optional Protocol to incorporate the
12 1
new right or freedom into the Convention system.
A somewhat more centrist position along the spectrum is occupied
by such Convention provisions as Article 12, which states that "[m]en
and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right."' 12 2 As this language makes plain, the Contracting States have
broad authority to control the exercise of the right to marry.1 23 The
Court has modified the consensus inquiry to accommodate this textbased deference to domestic law. Recent cases have demonstrated that
evolutionary trends in European law reform will erode a state's power to
12 4
regulate marriages only when the trends have been widely adopted.
Moreover, an expansion of Article 12 to include same sex partnerships
will be recognized only where European legal reforms amount to a
"general abandonment of the traditional concept of marriage."' 25
At the far end of the spectrum is found a cluster of fundamental
rights and freedoms, including respect for private and family life, home,
and correspondence; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of expression; and freedom of association. 126 These rights are
linked not by the content of the substantive norms they enshrine but
rather by the similarity of their texts. These Convention articles share
two significant features. First, they contain an exclusive list of rationales
upon which states may rely to restrict the exercise of the rights the articles protect. 12 7 Second, each of these articles further circumscribes
120. Id. at 39-40.

121. Id. at 40. In effect, the creation of an optional Protocol preempts the use of
rights-enhancing law reforms to modify the interpretation of the Convention's primary text. See Helfer, supra note 10, at 191-99.
122. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.

123. See Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1986) (Article
12 protects only "traditional marriage[s] between persons of opposite biological sex.
This appears from the wording of the Article which makes it clear that Article 12 is
mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis of the family.").

124. See F. v. Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16-17 (1987).
125. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1990).
126. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8-11.

127. Each of these articles consists of two paragraphs. The first enumerates the
content of the right while the second lists permissible limitations on its exercise. For
example, Article 10 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall

include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
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restrictions upon the rights therein by requiring that the restrictions be
"necessary in a democratic society."' 28 The Convention drafters left
this phrase undefined. The Court has construed it as requiring a "pressing social need"' 29 for limiting any of these rights. As one commentator
of the Court has noted:
In the concept of "necessary in a democratic society". . . there is written
into the very text of the European Convention a mechanism requiring the
Democratic
national law to respond to developing needs of society ....
society does not stand still, and neither does the way in which democratic
society upholds its cherished fundamental values. The drafters must be
democratic society one of
deemed to have realised this when they made
1 30
the governing elements of the Convention.
The variable nature of this reference to democratic values authorizes the
Court and Commission to apply the consensus inquiry in an aggressive
manner by searching for emerging regional trends and developing common rules for respecting those human rights that the drafters believed
should be vigilantly protected by all European nations.
2. Domestic Law Reforms
Having grounded the consensus inquiry in a textual framework, the
tribunals must then explore in detail the degree to which common practices appear in the domestic laws of the Contracting States, as well as the
views of relevant expert bodies and the European public. The existence
of a common perspective provides the tribunals with a motive to modernize the rights enshrined in the Convention by developing a uniform
European approach. While it is impossible to specify for every situation
a precise formula for the number of states that must have amended their
laws, at a minimum, at least half of the Contracting States should have
adopted some form of the rights-enhancing measure in question. This
majority rule serves as a minimum baseline against which the tribunals
can judge the emergence of genuinely regional norms. Beyond this
threshold, the justifications for creating a uniform perspective increase.
and ideas without interference by public authority regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing
of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-

tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 10.
128. Id. arts. 8-11.
129. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976).

130. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 64.
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a. Factors Favoring Deference to National Decision-Makers
As part of their analysis, the Court and Commission must pay careful
attention to the specific steps the Contracting States have taken to give
effect to emerging European human rights norms. In some cases, a simple head count of legislative developments may satisfy the consensus
inquiry, while in other cases states may have used different approaches
to address the same issue. In the latter instance, the tribunals' task is far
more complicated, for they must consider the various judicial, administrative, and legislative responses states have made and the extent to
which such measures represent merely an accommodation of individual
claims or a genuine recognition of the binding legal character of a new
human rights principle.
Where states have adopted a variety of responses, the Court and
Commission should respect their experimentation and encourage diversity by not imposing a single solution, at least until concordant state
practice proves such a measure to be clearly preferable to others. During this transitional phase, the tribunals can rightly conclude that states
that have made no effort at all to address the concerns raised by emerging regional norms have breached their Convention obligations. But
the tribunals must give those states engaged in the process of working
through a response an opportunity to strike the appropriate balance
between individual freedoms and other important concerns.
For example, the tribunals must be sensitive to the unique circumstances in each state that may have prevented it from reforming its laws,
even where a majority of states have recognized the existence of an
emerging regional norm. In extreme cases, these conditions will have
resulted in ratification of the Convention subject to an express reservation. But even where no reservation has been entered, the tribunals
should give somewhat greater deference to the policy rationales put forward by non-conforming states in two situations: first, where the tribunals can demonstrate that they lack the institutional competence to
adjudicate a particular category of disputes; 13 1 and second, where the
less progressive nations can be separated from their more progressive
counterparts by a distinction that divides the Contracting States along
common law/civil law lines 132 or according to geo-political subregions.13 3 During periods of consensus evolution, this additional mea131. See supra note 49.
132. Compare Warbrick, supra note 9, at 1083 n.69 ("the British government com-

plained that the Commission had been unduly influenced by inquisitorial concepts of
the criminal process") (citing Brogan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. Cour/Misc.

(88) 162, at 35-36 (argument of the United Kingdom)) with id. ("Belgian government
argued that the Commission had relied on an accusational understanding of criminal
procedure") (citing Lamy v. Belgium, Cour/Misc. (88) 64, at 11-13 (Memorial of
Belgium)).
133. Such geo-political distinctions might exist between Western and Eastern
European nations, or between EC and non-EC states. For example, the Court has
held that a Contracting State which adopts a preferential immigration policy for individuals from EC states does not violate the Convention's nondiscrimination pledge.
See Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1991).
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sure of deference allows states to consider alternative ways of adapting
to an emerging legal trend.
Factors Favoring an Assertive Role for the Tribunals
The deference to national authorities need not be absolute. As the
tribunals have noted, certain rights and freedoms enjoy enhanced judicial protection, either because of their textual composition in the Convention itself or their functional importance in European democratic
societies.13 4 The Court and Commission should not lightly dismiss any
infringement of these Convention guarantees. Moreover, the tribunals
can incorporate legal advancements expanding the scope of these highly
protected rights into the Convention at an earlier stage than they can for
comparable developments in areas where the Contracting States enjoy
35
greater discretion.'
The tribunals should also be more reluctant to grant a state a wide
margin of appreciation where national decision-makers such as
independent law commissions or parliamentary committees have
endorsed a rights-enhancing law reform.' 3 6 Similarly, deference may
not be necessary where the tribunals can discern a less rights-restrictive
means of achieving a Contracting State's objectives that the state itself
has acknowledged or applied.' 3 7 They may also claim greater authority
where the challenged law or administrative practice is selectively
13 8
enforced or has fallen into desuetude.
b.

3. International Treaties and Regional Legislation
Admittedly, many close cases will arise in which reasonable jurists will
differ over precisely how far a norm has evolved, even after carefully
analyzing the Convention's text and national law reform trends. In such
cases, the tribunals can look to developments in international law to
confirm the existence of a movement toward a common regional perspective in the Contracting States' domestic legislation and to limit an
individual state's discretion to adhere to a non-conformist position.
International indicia of consensus provide strong evidence that the
134. See supra notes 50, 126-30 and accompanying text.

135. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 5, at 64 ("Freedom of expression is a necessarily
organic and evolving concept, tied to the growth of democratic society in which it is
designed to flourish. In so far as a Convention provision covers variable social
notions of democracy, then the content of the guarantee provided by the Article must
necessarily also be subject to variation with each generation.").
136. See F. v. Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1987) (bill to repeal
legislation temporarily prohibiting remarriage after divorce approved by Committee

of Experts on Family Law Reform); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19

(1987) (reform of laws disadvantaging non-marital children under review by Austrian
government); Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1986) (Irish Par-

liament considering the equalization of legal rights for marital and non-marital families); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1978) (legislation
concerning corporal punishment under review by Manx Parliament).
137. See Rasmussen v. Denmark, 71 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 43 (1988) (Commission Report).
138. See Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1988).
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achievement of European unity with respect to a particular human right
13 9
is a "major goal in the member states of the Council of Europe,"
even if the current domestic practice of states does not yet conform to
that lofty aspiration.
In resorting to international law beyond the Convention's ambit,
not all developments need be given the same weight. Global multilateral treaties relating to human rights which have been widely adopted by
European states should be given the greatest force. 140 A heavy burden
should be placed on Contracting States attempting to argue against the
enforcement of a provision contained in these instruments which the
international community recognizes to have developed into customary
14 1
law orjus cogens.
Treaties that have been opened for signature only to the member
states of the Council of Europe should also be viewed as convincing evidence of a developing regional perspective on individual rights, particularly where they have been signed or ratified by a large number of
states.142 However, not all such treaties are equally probative of consensus. Instruments that overlap to some degree with the Convention's
substantive norms should have the strongest influence on the tribunals'
case law, whereas regional treaties that create additional rights beyond
the ambit of the Convention should be viewed with caution. For example, the Court has stated that the European Social Charter 43 contains
139. Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 37-38 (1985); see also Open Door Counselling Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 14,234/88,
14 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 131, 143 (1991) (Commission Report) (Mr. H.G. Schermers,
concurring) ("Increasingly States have transferred sovereign power to common institutions. Next to (or above) the national societies a European society is developing.
For deciding whether a specific restriction... is necessary in Europe the European
society as a whole should also be taken into account.").
140. Such instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967);
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/
180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 19 I.L.M. 33
(1980); and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at
197, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984), 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
141. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1989) (citing
multilateral conventions as evidence that prohibition of torture and degrading treatment or punishment "is generally recognized as an internationally accepted
standard").
142. Examples include the European Convention on Transfrontier Television,
May 5, 1989, Europ. T.S. No. 132; the Convention Concerning the Establishment of
Maternal Filiation of Children Born Out of Wedlock, Sept. 12, 1962, 932 U.N.T.S.
73; the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock,
Oct. 15, 1975, Europ. T.S. No. 85. The tribunals have already looked to these agreements as evidence of a consensus "evolution." Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 19 (1979); see also Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
27 (1990); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1987).
143. Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
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certain substantive provisions that are beyond the scope of the
Convention. 144

Other important regional developments include the recommendations and resolutions of the Committee of Ministers, which are designed
to encourage the member states of the Council of Europe to develop
harmonious policies on matters of common interest, including human
rights. 145 Where such pronouncements purport to interpret or augment the Convention, they can be seen as substantiating a trend toward
an evolving European viewpoint. Slightly reduced weight can be
accorded similar recommendations and resolutions of the Parliamentary
Assembly. 146 These documents are less authoritative because they must
first be screened by the Ministers before being sent on to the member
states. 14 7 The persuasive force of both the Ministers' and the Assembly's recommendations becomes more compelling as the Contracting
States incorporate their suggestions into domestic law.
C. The Benefits of a More Rigorous Approach
Applying the above framework will permit the tribunals to inject greater
rigor into the European consensus inquiry. A clearer exposition of the
tribunals' reasoning and balancing of competing factors is necessary,
even where the conclusions reached by individual jurists differ. Indeed,
the absence of an objective "bright line" rule for deciding when an
emerging norm has crystallized into a new rule of rights-protection
makes such divergences unavoidable. But if the Court and Commission
are committed to using a consensus-based methodology, they must both
acknowledge the ambiguity that is a necessary consequence of such an
approach and strive to develop general principles for weighing the competing elements of the consensus inquiry and the margin of appreciation
doctrine.
For example, the majority's argument in Cossey would have been far
more persuasive had it clarified why the "certain developments" since
Rees did not warrant a reconsideration of the consensus analysis. In fact,
144. See National Union of Swedish Engine Drivers v. Sweden, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 15 (1976); National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 18 (1976). For a comprehensive analysis of the Court's use of international treaties as an interpretive device, see MERRILIS, supra note 2, at 198-204.
145. See Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 17, arts. 15, 20. Relevant
examples of the Ministers' work include: Recommendation No. R (85) 2 on Legal
Protection Against Sex Discrimination, reprintedin 28 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 220
(1985) and Recommendation No. R (83) 2 Concerning the Legal Protection of Per-

sons Suffering from Mental Disorder Placed as Involuntary Patients, reprinted in 26
Y.B. EUR. CoN,. ON H.R. at 52 (1983).
146. Important Assembly legislation relating to human rights include: Resolution
855 on Equality Between Men and Women, Eur. Parl. Ass., 38th Sess. (1986); Recommendation 971 on the Protection of Detainees from Torture and from Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Eur. Parl. Ass., 35th Sess. (1983);

Recommendation 924 on Discrimination Against Homosexuals, Eur. Parl. Ass., 33d
Sess. (1981); and Recommendation 816 on the Right of Conscientious Objection to

Military Service, Eur. Parl. Ass., 29th Sess. (1977).
147. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 17, art. 22.
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the majority might well have defended its position on the dissent's own

terms: that many of the states which had permitted transsexuals to
amend their identity documents had done so through individualized

judicial and administrative procedures (as opposed to national legislative reforms) and that this diversity of practice counseled against compelling the United Kingdom to develop a legislative response to
recognize a transsexual's surgically-acquired gender. The majority
could have further strengthened its argument by quoting the text of
Recommendation 1117, which emphasized that "the legislation of many
member states is seriously deficient in this area." 1 48 Exposing these
underlying concerns not only renders the Court's adherence to a "wait

and see" approach far more reasonable, but also helps to rebut Judge
Marten's charge that the majority's analysis was "based on a distortion
149

of the real state of affairs."'
Similarly, in B. v. France, a more searching discussion of why the
French courts' fact-based recognition of a transsexual's acquired identity violated the Convention would have enhanced the Court's reasoning. The Court might have explained that the difficult legal situation
facing transsexuals required France to modify the civil status register of
any person who, because of hormone therapy and gender reassignment
surgery, could demonstrate a discrepancy between external appearance
and official gender. In this way, the French courts' adherence to rigorous medical standards could be seen as giving insufficient consideration
to a transsexual's privacy concerns, notwithstanding the fact that medi15 0
cal research on the nature of transsexualism was still unsettled.
Alternatively, the Court might have concluded that the scientific understanding of transsexualism had evolved since Cossey, thereby eroding
France's ability to rely on exacting medical criteria as the touchstone for
5
legal recognition.1 '
D.

The Benefits of Ambiguity: A Rejoinder

Although there are clear advantages to a more rigorous consensus
methodology, the counter-argument to this Article's thesis must be
presented and refuted. The struggle for coherence and precision is
arguably an unnecessary and improper task for international tribunals
that must master the intricacies of twenty-four distinct legal systems.
Because the Court and Commission must consider so many applications
from this wide array of nations, the argument goes, they would be more
148. Recommendation 1117, Eur. Parl. Ass., 41st Sess.

8 (1989).

149. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37 (1990) (Martens,
J., dissenting).
150. While these general principles can be inferred from the judgment, a more
explicit exposition of the jurists' analysis would have assisted France in fashioning a
remedy for its violation and would have given other Contracting States and human
rights advocates a clearer understanding of the contours of this emerging legal issue.
151. B. had made just such an argument before the Court. See B. v. France, App.
No. 13,343/87, slip op. at 19 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 25, 1992) (to be printed in 232 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)).
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effective institutions by remaining elusive about both the elements of
the consensus inquiry and the degree of harmonization needed to modernize the Convention.
In this way, the tribunals could exercise an internal, unarticulated
control over the scope of the Contracting States' obligations in two
opposing situations. First, they might refuse to declare a violation of the
Convention as a matter of prudence where such an action would offend
a respondent state, even if the indicia of consensus pointed toward that
violation; and second, they might use a less precise analysis to enhance
the protection of individual rights where the formation of a progressive
regional norm had not yet fully emerged. Although this methodology
gives the Court and Commission flexibility to reach a desired result, it
risks judicial illegitimacy: in the first case by failing to uphold the Convention's objective of providing effective human rights guarantees and
in the second by unduly encroaching on the Contracting States'
sovereignty.
If such an approach were possible and even desirable when the
Convention was still in its infancy and when consensus questions could
be resolved by unanimous or nearly unanimous judgments, recent cases
on family law, gender equality, and transsexualism reveal that it is no
longer tenable. There are substantial disagreements about the scope
and function of the consensus inquiry among the judges and the Commission members. States, applicants, and scholars also have cause to
question the tribunals' reasoning and results. Given the contingent
nature of the Contracting States' participation in the treaty framework,
allowing this ambiguity to continue as the Convention becomes progressively more rights-protective may weaken the stature of the tribunals
and result in an increasing number of unheeded judgments.
Conclusion
As consensus-based disputes expand over an increasingly sensitive field
of human rights claims, the tribunals will face a choice: they can continue their current ad hoc approach, creating an inconsistent case law
that may undermine their authority; or they can attempt to develop a
principled basis for approaching the consensus inquiry that will enable
them to deal with the inevitable controversies of application in a persuasive and logical manner. The purpose of this Article is to suggest one
such principled foundation for consensus-driven human rights adjudication. Although the challenge of building a coherent vision for the consensus inquiry is formidable, the tribunals must undertake it.

